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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by a materialman brought under 
the provisions of 14-2-2 of the Utah Code Annotated 
195:3, against the owners because of the failure of the 
owners to obtain a bond from their contractor. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT 
The case was tried without a jury on the 22nd 
day of June, 1966, and the court found that the statute 
of limitations applicable to the statute was one year 
and that the supplier was barred by the statute of limi-
tations as to all of the owners but one and that it failed 
to qualify itself as a materialman under the statute 
as to the one. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the judgment and an 
order remanding the case back for re-trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The action was brought by the plaintiff against 
the defendant Stanley D. Robinson, the sub-contractor 
who became bankrupt and some twenty-five owners of 
homes built by the Olympic Construction Company, 
for the reasonable value of roofing materials furnished 
by the plaintiff between January and October, 1964. 
The Olympic Construction Company intervened and 
offered to accept liability for the respective owners. All 
of the essential elements under 14-2-2 of the statute 
were admitted except the qualification of the plaintiff 
as a materialman and the reasonable value of the ma· 
terials. 
The court found that the one year statute of limi-
tations barred all of the actions except one, paragraph 
2 
:23, an<l as to that one that the plaintiff did not furnish 
materials under the contract, (Tr. 113). Or, as set out 
m paragraphs 1 and 2 of the conclusions of law on 
i:-lage 105 of the record, the plaintiffs claim against all 
of the defendants except Youngberg is barred by reason 
of the one-year statute of limitations found at 78-12-
29 ( 2) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and that with 
respect to the built up roofs, of which Youngberg was 
one, the plaintiff was not a materialman furnishing 
material under the contract as contemplated by Title 
U, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Four of 
the homes were shingled and the others were gravel, 
or built up roofs. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE 
ONE YEAR STATUTE. 
This is an action created by statute. The three year 
limitation found at 78-12-26 ( 4), Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, should have been applied. If the intention 
of the legislature had been otherwise there would have 
been no need for the 1965 legislature to have amended 
the statute so as to give it a present one year limitation. 
The one year statute, as provided in 78-12-29 (2) 
applies only when there is a penalty or forfeiture, which 
is not the case here. 
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The remedy given by 14-2-2 is purely compel!sa-
tory, and is considered by the authorities to be a lia-
bility created by statute and not a fine or a penalty. 
23 A. J. at page 625, paragraph 29: 
"A statutory obligation to pay damages which 
the common law does not give is a liability cre-
ated by statute, and not a penalty, where the 
damages awarded are strictly compensatory.'' 
The decision in the case of John H. Slater v. 
Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe Fy. Co., 137 P 943, 
discusses the question quite fully citing many cases 
and holds that the three year statute should apply. At 
page 953: 
"The trial court held this action barred by the 
one year statute. The judgment was reversed, 
and it was held that the action was upon 'a lia-
bility created by statute' and not an action for n 
penalty or forfeiture." 
The case of Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 
makes the following distinction: 
"The question whether a statute of one state, 
which in some respects may be called penal, is 
a penal law in the international sense, so that it 
cannot be enforced in the courts of another state. 
depends upon the question. whether its .purp~se 
is to punish an offense agamst the pubhc policy 
of the state, or to afford a private remedy to a 
person injured by the wrongful act." 
The remedy provided by 14-2-2 of the Utah Code 
is purely compensatory. It is in no sense a "forfeiture 
or penalty." The three year statute should apply. 
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POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF WAS A l\tlATERIALMAN 
FllRNISHING MATERIALS UNDER THE 
CONTRACT. 
The court erred m finding that the plaintiff was 
not a materialman furnishing materials under the con-
tract on the built up roofs. 
The evidence shows by a great preponderance 
that the plaintiff furnished all of the felt used on the 
built up roofs. 
The testimony of Charles Robinson taken from 
page 55 of the transcript, commencing with line 24, is 
as follows: 
"I have checked with Stanley Robinson many 
times, and I know that his felts were purchased 
at my place of business." 
and from page 56, line 26: 
"At the time Mr. Robinson took this contract 
on, and entered into the contract, he came to me 
to purchase the material, and he agreed that he 
would buy all his material from me, if I would 
go along on the job. 
Question: Did you do that? Answer: Yes." 
The plaintiff offered to make the proof positive 
that no felt was purchased for the built up roofs on 
these houses from any other source and was refused (Tr. 
ll3, line 1). 
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CONCLUSION 
The court erred in applying the one year statute 
of limitations and in finding that the plaintiff did not 
furnish materials on the built up roofs under the con-
tract. The case should be remanded for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HORACE J. KNOWLTON 
214 Tenth Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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